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ABSTRACT
Economists have examined the impact of labor market regulations on the level of employment.
However, there are many reasons to suspect that the impact of regulations differs across types of
workers. In this paper we take advantage of the unusual large variance in labor policy in Chile to
exa mine how different labor market regulations affect the distribution of employment and the
employment rates across age, gender and skill levels. To this effect, we use a sample of repeated
cross-section household surveys spanning the period 1960-1998 and measures of the evolution of
job security provisions and minimum wages across time. Our results suggest large distribution
effects. We find that employment security provisions and minimum wages reduce the share of
youth and unskilled employment as well as their employment rates. We also find large effects on
the distribution of employment between women and men.
Claudio E. Montenegro Carmen Pagés
The World Bank Inter-American Development Bank  1
 
1.  Introduction 
The economic literature has devoted considerable attention to s tudying the impact of labor market 
regulations on labor market outcomes. However, the issue of whether some sub-groups of workers bear 
the brunt or enjoy the benefits of such regulations has been much less studied.
2 One notable exception has 
been the burgeoning literature studying the effect of statutory minimum wages on youth employment. 
Although this subject remains controversial, many studies have found negative effects of minimum wages 
on teenagers and young workers.
3 Less attention has been paid to the issue of whether minimum wages 
particularly affect women or men or unskilled versus skilled workers.  Similarly, very little attention has 
been paid to the effect that job security provisions may have on particular sub-groups of the labor force.  
In this paper, we take advantage of the unusual variance in labor market policies in Chile to 
examine how minimum wages and job security provisions affect different types of workers. To this effect, 
we use a sample of repeated household surveys spanning the period 1960-1998 and several measures of 
labor market regulations across time.  We make use of cross-section and time-series methods to estimate 
the effect that these policies have on the distribution of employment and on the particular sub-groups 
employment rates. To assess whether our estimates are reflecting the effect of regulations instead of the 
effect of some unobservable correlates, we also estimate the effect of labor policy on sectors not covered 
by regulations. We find large and statistically significant effects on the covered sectors and no effects, or 
effects going in the opposite direction, in the uncovered sectors.  
Our results indicate that labor market regulations are far from neutral. We find that job security 
provisions and minimum wages reduce the employment rates of the youth and the unskilled at the benefit 
of older and skilled workers. We also find opposite effects of these policies on women’s and men’s 
employment shares and rates. Job security provisions tend to benefit men at the expense of women, while 
the reverse seems to be true for an increase in the minimum wage.   
We then explore some explanations for these regularities and, while we cannot fully discriminate 
among all of them, we are at least able to reject some hypotheses. There is little evidence that these 
differential effects are driven by differences in labor supply elasticities or wage adjustments across sub-
groups. Instead, our findings suggest  that labor market regulations produce unequal shifts in labor 
demand across groups of workers.  
      
                                                                 
2 One reference in this literature is the paper by Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2002) on the effect of unions’ involvement 
in wage setting on the relative employment of youth, women and older individuals.  
3 Among the most recent studies, Williams and Mills (2001), Partridge and Partridge (1998) and Bazen and Skourias 
(1997) find a negative relation between minimum wages and youth employment, while Katz and Krueger (1992), 
Card and Krueger (1994, 2000) and Card, Katz and Krueger (1993) find no evidence of such an effect.    2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the arguments that predict non-
neutral effects of regulations. Section 3 describes the evolution of job security and minimum wage 
regulations in Chile. Section 4 describes the data used in our empirical section. Section 5 describes the 
methodology implemented to  estimate the  effects of regulations on the distribution of employment. 
Section 6 describes our results for both the distribution of employment and the overall effect on 
employment rates. Finally, Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  Why Regulations May Affect Some Workers Differently 
There are a number of reasons to suspect that labor market regulations alter the distribution of 
employment across sub-groups. In the next two subsections we review the theoretical arguments that 
predict differential effects of job security provisions and minimum wages across workers of different age, 
skill level and gender. 
 
2.1 Job Security 
Job security provisions are introduced to discourage firms from adjusting their labor forces in the face of 
adverse economic conditions. However, job security provisions also alter hiring decisions.  In good times, 
firms hire fewer workers because they take into account that these workers may have to be laid off in the 
future, and that is costly. The overall impact of job security provisions on employment rates is 
undetermined because it depends on whether the negative effect on layoffs is offset by the reduction in 
hiring rates.
4  
Job security provisions will have differential effects across sub-groups of workers if changes in 
legislation bring changes in hiring and layoff rates that have a larger impact on some sub-populations than 
on others. Lazear (1990) conjectured that an increase in job security might act as a barrier preventing the 
entry of young workers into the labor market. This is because job security reduces job creation, and entry 
rates are especially high among youth. This argument, however, does not consider that the effect of lower 
job creation rates can be offset by lower job destruction rates—which also tend to be large among youth.  
Pagés and Montenegro (1999) suggest an argument  whereby job security  provisions  may actually 
increase young workers’ layoff rates.  Their argument is related to the regularity that, across countries, 
job security is positively related with a worker’s tenure. Mandatory severance payments that increase with  
tenure change the cost of dismissing workers with short tenures relative to workers with more seniority at 
the firm. In this context, it is expected that job security concentrates layoffs among youth because, other 
things being equal, young workers tend to have lower average tenures than older workers. If severance   3
pay increases substantially with tenure and this effect is important, job security simultaneously reduces 
entry and increases layoffs among youth, resulting in a lower employment share and lower employment 
rates for this group of workers. Instead, the share of older workers in employment tends to increase due to 
their relatively lower layoff rates 
A similar reasoning can be used to predict the effect of job security provisions across gender. To 
the extent that women experience higher rotation and therefore have lower average tenure than males at 
every age, high job security will tend to concentrate layoffs among women. This effect will tend to reduce 
their employment share relative to men. However, higher turnover rates also imply that stringent job 
security may be less of an issue when hiring female workers because employers expect them to quit prior 
to attaining high job security.
5  In this case, employers might be more willing to hire women relative to 
men, but also more likely to lay them off should bad times arise.  The overall effect on female versus 
male employment rates is undetermined and remains an empirical issue.
 
It is tempting to extend  the former argument to unskilled and skilled workers. If unskilled 
workers have higher rotation and lower tenures than skilled workers, the same reasoning  applies. 
However, while it can be defended that higher female turnover rates may be motivated by life-cycle 
decisions exogenous to the employer, such exogeneity is more difficult to claim  when explaining the 
higher rotation of unskilled workers.  
The insider-outsider literature provides further arguments for why job security may have a 
differential effect on the employment rates of different sub-populations.
6 According to this literature, 
more stringent job security reduces the elasticity of wages to changes in the unemployment rate. When 
employed workers know their jobs are insured against demand fluctuations, they may be less willing to 
accept the wage adjustments necessary to reduce unemployment rates. This situation may help to create 
two kinds of workers: insiders, who hold their jobs and have high wages, and outsiders, who either are 
unemployed or hold temporary, part-time or fixed terms jobs without job security.
7  If women, the young 
and the unskilled are more likely to be outsiders, then job security (through this wage effect) will bias 
employment against these groups. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
4 See Bertola (1990), Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bertola (1991), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994), Hopenhayn and 
Rogerson (1993) and Risager and Sorensen (1997) among others for a theoretical discussion of the effects of job 
security on employment rates.  
5  See Pagés and Montenegro (1999) for a more formal development of this argument in the context of a partial 
equilibrium model. 
6 See for instance, Lindbeck and Snower (1988). 
7 The insider outsider argument requires a strong union fixing wages for new entrants. Otherwise, firms could 
always pay very low wages at the beginning of the employment relationship to compensate for higher wages in the 
future. See Bertola (1990) for an analytical study of this issue.   4
Finally, differences in labor supply elasticity may contribute to differential effects across sub-
populations even if job security brings a uniform change in labor demand across groups. Let us assume 
that an increase in job security reduces labor demand. If women, the young, and the unskilled have higher 
labor supply elasticity than the average worker, higher job security would bring a higher decline in 
employment for these workers than for other groups with a lower elasticity of labor supply.
8 
Summarizing, the arguments put forth in this section suggest that youth, and possibly women and 
the unskilled, bear the brunt of job security regulations.  
 
2.2 Minimum Wages 
The effect of minimum wages on employment remains a controversial topic. In the competitive model, 
workers are paid their marginal product, and any artificial increase in the price of l abor above the 
marginal product therefore prices the worker out of the labor market. Conversely, models based on some 
form of imperfect competition predict wages lower than the marginal product, and thus, an increase in 
minimum wages can increase wages without reducing employment rates.
9  
On average, youth, women, and the unskilled tend to have lower wages than older, male or skilled 
workers. Therefore, since minimum wages are more likely to be binding among these workers, the 
competitive model predicts larger unemployment effects for the first group. In the imperfect competition 
model , however, the effects are less clear-cut. In principle, the magnitude and sign of the minimum wage 
effect will depend on how far wages are from their respective marginal products in each sub-population. 
If that gap is larger in some groups than in others, an increase in minimum wages may have “competitive” 
effects on some groups and “non-competitive” effects on others. Given this ambiguity, the sign and 
magnitude of the effects become an empirical question. 
 
 
3.  Labor Market Regulations in Chile  
Chile has experienced a very wide range in labor market policies, providing a privileged case scenario for 
analyzing the impact of regulations on labor  market outcomes.  We distinguish between job security 
provisions and statutory minimum wages.
10 
                                                                 
8 See Hamermesh (1993). 
9There are many situations that give raise to imperfect competition in the labor market, such like monopolistic 
power by part of employees, incomplete information or imperfectly mobile workers.  
10 See Edwards and Cox -Edwards (2000) for an excellent summary of labor market reforms in Chile during the 
1960-2000 period.    5
3.1 Job Security Provisions 
Among  the most interesting aspects of the Chilean experience is that, in the 39  years covered by our 
sample, Chile has gone from a situation of dismissal at will to a rigid labor market by OECD standards.
11 
Since their inception in 1966, job security provisions have favored full-time indefinite employment over 
part-time, fixed-term of temporary contractual relationships. To this end, in case of a firm-initiated 
separation, labor codes regulate (1) compulsory advance notice periods, (2) the causes for which a 
dismissal is considered justified or unjustified and (3) severance pay related to the tenure of a worker and 
the cause of dismissal. While the minimum period of advance noticed has always been kept constant and 
equal to one month, the formula for computing severance pay and the causes for just or unjust dismissal 
have widely varied over the years.  This is the variance that we exploit in our empirical work.  
Table 1 summarizes the changes in legislation that took place in the 1960-1998 period. From 
1960 to mid 1966, firms had to provide a one-month advance notice (or pay the equivalent of one month 
of salary) but otherwise “employment at will” was the norm.  In 1966, the congress approved a new law 
under which firms had to pay compensation equal to one month’s wage per year of work to all workers 
dismissed without just cause. The economic needs of the firm were considered a just cause in the law and 
therefore a worker dismissed for this reason would not qualify for severance pay. In practice, however, 
workers would appeal to courts and judges tended to consider these dismissals unjustified.
12 In that event, 
the employer could choose between paying the mandatory compensation–plus wages foregone during 
trial —or reinstate the worker in his/her old post. This reform substantially increased the difficulty and the 
cost of labor force adjustments.   
After 1973, a violent change in political regime brought about a de facto liberalization. Although 
job security provisions were not modified in the law, in practice, it was more likely that judges ruled 
against workers, effectively reducing dismissal costs. In 1989 and 1981, successive modifications reduced 
the cost of dismissal under the law. In 1981, the maximum amount to be awarded to a worker dismissed 
without a just cause was reduced to the equivalent of five months’ pay. This reform substantially reduced 
the cost of dismissal, particularly for workers with long tenures, although it only applied to newly hired 
workers.   
After 1984, the tide shifted and job security provisions became progressively stricter. In 
December of that year, the law was modified to exclude economic needs of the firm as a justified cause of 
dismissal. However, the maximum amount payable to a worker was kept at five months of pay.  In 1990, 
after the return of democracy, a new labor reform still in force further increased the cost of dismissal. This 
law considers dismissals motivated by the economic needs of the firm justified but employers are still 
                                                                 
11 Heckman and Pagés (2000). 
12 Romaguera et al. (1995).   6
liable to pay compensation equal to one month’s pay per year of work with a maximum amount of 11 
months of pay.  It is the responsibility  of the firm to prove just cause. If such causality  cannot be 
demonstrated, there is a 20 percent surcharge in the amount of compensation.   
We summarize this variance in law and court practice by means of a job security measure derived 
in Pagés and Montenegro (1999).
13  This measure is computed as follows:  
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where d  is the probability of remaining in a job, b is the discount factor, T is the maximum tenure that a 
worker can attain in a firm, bt+i  is the advance notice to a worker that has been i years with a firm, at is 
the probability that the economic difficulties of the firm are considered a justified cause of dismissal, 
SPt+1
jc is the mandated severance pay in such event to a worker that has been i years at the firm, and 
finally,  SPt+1
uc  denotes the payment to be awarded to a worker with tenure  i in case of unjustified 
dismissal.
14   
This measure computes the expected cost, at the time a worker is hired, of dismissing this worker 
in the future. This cost is measured in terms of monthly wages. The advantage of this measure in respect 
to other measures that compute the cost conditional on having achieved a certain tenure i s that our job 
security measure captures the whole profile of severance pay at each level of tenure. The assumption is 
that firms evaluate future dismissal costs based on current law. Higher values of this variable indicate 
periods of relatively high job security whereas lower values characterize periods in which dismissals were 
less costly. 
Based on the legal information summarized in Table 1 and assumptions regarding b, d, a, and T, 
we obtain a measure of JS. We take b to be a constant value such that the average real interest is equal to 
8.4%, which corresponds to the average real interest rate in Chile during the 1960-1998 period.  The 
discount rate is computed based on the assumption that without job security, turnover rates in Chile would 
be comparable to the ones observed in the US.
15 Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) report an average annual 
turnover rate of 12%. The probability that a dismissal originated by the economic needs of the firm will 
be considered just depends on whether the law says so and whether labor judges rule so if workers take 
firms to courts. For the period 1966-1984,  although  despite that economic needs of the firm were 
considered just cause in the law, we assume a to be larger than zero and depending on labor courts stand. 
                                                                 
13 See the mentioned paper and Heckman and Pagés (2000) for a complete description of the methodology used, 
how it is applied across time and countries and the relative advantages and costs of using this measure versus other 
measures of job security. 
   7
Finally, we assume T = 25. See Table 2 for a complete description of the parameters used in the 
computation of the JS measure.   
The evolution of this variable over time is depicted in Graph 1. After some years of relatively low 
employment protection, JS increases eight-fold after the introduction of compulsory severance pay in the 
law. Expected dismissal costs decline markedly in 1973 and then successively in 1978 and 1981. 
Subsequently, employment protection increases again but without reaching the levels attained during the 
late 1960s.   
 
3.2 Minimum Wages   
Columns two and three in Table 3 present the hourly real minimum wage in pesos of 1998.
16 These 
indices were constructed using Chile’s Central Bank Bulletins. It is interesting to note that since 1989 
there has been a lower minimum wage for workers 18 years old or younger.  This wage has been fixed at 
a level between 15 and 20 percent of the adult wage. Graph 2 summarizes the evolution of the minimum 
wage in relation to the average wage for teen and adult workers. The graph shows that minimum wages 
are much higher, relative to each group average rate, for teen than for adult workers. It also shows that the 
level of teen minimum wages has been quite volatile relative to the average wage.  
Between 1960 and 1998, adult real minimum wages increased by 186% and teen minimum wages 
by 104%. However, because average ages rose by more, minimum wages lost ground in relation to the 
average wage. Despite this long-term secular trend, Chile experienced a wide range of fluctuations in 
minimum wages, both in its rate of growth (in real terms) and in its level in relation to the average wage.  
During the 1960s, the real value of minimum wages was held constant, but since real wages increased, the 
ratio of the minimum to the average real wage declined. In the early 1970s, minimum wages increased 
substantially, surpassing the growth rate of average wages. In consequence, the ratio of the minimum to 
the average real wage increased sharply in that period. From 1975 to 1980 minimum wages lost ground 
relative to the average wage. After the return to democracy in 1990, real minimum wages increased 
steadily, but they continued declining relative to the average wage.  The decline was particularly sharp for 
the teen group, whose minimum to average real wage rate fell from 1.80 in 1975 to 0.50 in 1998. It is 
interesting to note that while there are several studies in the Chilean case that suggests that the minimum 
wage is binding, others like Bravo and Vial (1997) suggest that it is not.
17  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
15 Although turnover rates can be measured, this measure is itself affected by labor law. Given this endogeneity, we 
choose instead to use the U.S. turnover rate, since it is well established that dismissal costs in the U.S. are very 
small.  
16 Per hour minimum wages are constructed as monthly minimum wages divided by 4.2*40 hours.  
17  See, for instance, Castañeda (1983), Paredes and Riveros (1989), Montenegro (2002) and Cowan et al. (2003). 
An excellent review of the impact of minimum wages in the case of the United States can be found in Kosters   8
4.  Data 
The household surveys used in this study were obtained from the University of Chile’s Economics 
Department. The Economics Department’s Survey monitors the employment-unemployment status in the 
metropolitan area of Santiago de Chile four times a year. Unfortunately, only the surveys taken in June of 
each year contain information about wages and other employment status variables. Therefore, these are 
the surveys used in this study. The format of the survey and the definition of the variables have been kept 
constant since 1957, when the survey started, and so the information contained in them is comparable 
across years.
18 During the period 1960 to 1998, the surveys interviewed b etween 10,000 and 16,000 
people, and around 3,700 and 5 ,400 active labor force participants each year. During this period, the 
Metropolitan Area of Santiago de Chile represented about one third of Chile’s total population, and a 
higher proportion of GDP.
19 The data set is formed by stacked cross-sectional data sets, which means that 
individuals are not followed over time. The only restriction applied to our sample is that the people 
included in the estimates must be at least 15 years old and no older than 65. 
We merge labor policy and macro variables taken at the annual frequency with our individual- 
level annual data. We include the job security index and the minimum wage data described in Section 3. 
We also include a measure of wage bargaining to control for changes in union activity that can be 
correlated to our variables and to employment. While perhaps the best measure of influence of unions in 
wage determination is union coverage, that is, the share of workers whose wages are affected by 
collective bargaining, a time series of this nature does not exist in Chile. Since union membership is not 
available either for all years covered in our sample, we measure unions’ bargaining power by means of an 
index that reflects the degree of centralization of collective bargaining constructed by Edwards and Cox- 
Edwards (2000). This variable takes values from 1 (total decentralization) to 4 (total centralization). The 
use of this measure is based on the observation that union coverage tends to be larger in countries where 
collective bargaining is centralized. Finally, we include as a measure of economic activity deviations with 
respect to potential GDP. To obtain this variable, we use GDP data from the World Bank and apply a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter to obtain trend GDP.    
Table 3 summarizes some basic statistics of our sample, by year. The first three columns display 
the value of the job security index and the real minimum wage for people 18 or younger and for adult 
workers. The next two columns summarize the index of bargaining (column four presents the original 
index, and column five presents the smoothed index). The evolution of these variables over time is 
depicted in Graph 5 . Higher values of this measure, like those registered from 1960 to 1970,  reflect 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
(1996).  A  more  recent survey on the international evidence  of minimum wages can be found in Dowrick and 
Quiggin (2003).  
18 In this study we use data from 1960 on, because the previous years (1957-1959) do not have reliable data. 
19 According to the 1992 Census, the metropolitan area accounted for 39 percent of the total population.   9
periods of higher union centralization.
20 The next seven columns summarize the average hourly wage 
broken down by sex (columns six and seven); skill level (columns eight and nine) and age group 
(columns ten, eleven and twelve). Column thirteen summarizes the deviation of the GDP from its 
potential or trend value. Finally, columns fourteen, fifteen and sixteen present the percentage of total 
people employed, the percentage of people that work for someone else (wage employment), and the 
percentage of people self-employed as a proportion of total population between 15 and 65 years old. 
These three rates are also depicted in Graph 3, which jointly with Graph 4 (which shows GDP deviations 
from its trend), illustrates the violent swings experienced by the Chilean economy during the 1960-1998 
period, and in particular between 1970 and 1985.
21 Some additional indicators describing the performance 
of the Chilean economy are summarized in Table 4.   
 
5.  Methodology 
To estimate the differential impact of labor market regulations across sub-populations we assume that the 




ijt = Xit*b1+X’it*Z t*b2+ gt  + eijt         (1) 
where 
yijt =1  if  y
*
ijt  > 0 




ijt   is an unobservable variable that determines whether an individual i, in sub-population j, at time t 
will be employed or not, and y ijt is the observable employment status of this individual. In addition, Xit is a 
vector of variables that summarizes the personal characteristics of the individual i at time t, Zt is a vector 
of variables that vary with  t,  gt  is a  year fixed effect and eijt is an error term.  Among the personal 
characteristics we include age, gender, skill level, number of children and number of children interacted 
with gender. In some specifications, we also include age interacted with gender, and age interacted with 
skill to capture differential effects of age across gender and skill groups. Given the number of 
observations available, we divided the data into three age groups (15-24, 25-50, and 51-65) and two skill 
levels (9 years of education or less, and more than 9 years). Adding the skill and the age groups to the 
gender division, we have 12 different sub-populations, j=1,…12 
                                                                 
20 Although not shown in the results, we checked the robustness of our results using the strikes index constructed by 
Edwards and Cox -Edwards (2000) instead of the centralization index . The results were invariant to different 
specifications.   10 
  In the vector of aggregate variables Zt we include the index of job security, deviations from GDP 
trend and the union centralization variable (all in logarithms). We also include the minimum wage index 
(also in logarithms), but we let it change for individuals 18 and younger.  By construction, the vector of 
coefficients on the interaction of  Xit and  Zt,,  b2, gives  the sign of the  differential effect. In addition, 
assuming that the Prob(y
*
ijt > 0) is distributed as a standard normal distribution, the size of the marginal 
differential effect is given by f(.)Xitb2, where f(. ) is the normal density function.  
  Our original intention was to estimate  
y
*
ijt = Xit*b1+X’it*Z t*b2  + Zt*b3 + eijt     (1’) 
With such a specification we could recover the total marginal effect of a labor policy on sub-population j 
as f(.)(Xitb2 +b3). However, despite finding robust estimates for the differential effects, our estimates for 
the level effect (b3) proved to be extremely sensitive to the set of variables included in Zt., suggesting that 
our time variables did not properly account for the time variation of the series.  In view of these results, 
we opted for estimating specification (1). This estimation still allows us to compute marginal effects, but 
the total effects are now absorbed by the constant term. Therefore, we can measure the impact of labor 
market regulations on the distribution but not on the level of employment.  
Although specification (1) is a reduced form equation, in some cases, it will be useful to add a 
measure of wages. To construct this variable, wijt, we assign to all workers i ˛ j, j=1,..,12, at period t, the 
average wage of all employed workers in group j at period t.  
We minimize the risk of omitted variable biases and spurious correlations in five ways: First, by 
using individual data from a series of stacked household surveys to estimate specification (1), we can 
control for changes in the relative size of the population of each group and changes in fertility which, if 
omitted, could bias our estimates. Second, by introducing time dummies, we control for macroeconomic 
trends and cycles as well as policy changes that affect the overall population. Third, by controlling for 
effect of changes in the business cycle (using GDP deviations from its trend) across individuals (that is, 
including X’it* Zt , where Zt  contains the business cycle variable) we can partially control for changes in 
policy and institutions that are endogenous to changes in relative employment. This is because such 
movements are likely to be correlated with changes in the business cycle. Fourth, by estimating the 
differential effect of policy while including contemporary labor market policies and institutions, we make 
sure  that our measured effects are not biased by the correlation between these variables and the 
distribution of employment. Lastly, by comparing the estimated effects on the probability of wage 
employment (which is covered by labor policy) with the results on self-employment (which is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
21 The Chilean economic performance has been extensively documented by Edwards and Cox -Edwards (1987, 
2000), de la Cuadra and Hachette (1991), Wisecarver (1992), Bosworth, Dornbusch and Laban (1994), Hudson 
(1994), Soto  (1995), and Cortazar and Vial (1998).   11 
covered), we assess whether we are capturing the effect of policy, or instead, the effect of some 
unobservable correlate. 
 
6. Empirical Results  
 
6.1 The Effect of Job Security on the Distribution of Employment 
Our results indicate that job security provisions have a differential impact across demographic sub-
groups. In Table 5, we report the results of estimating our empirical specification (1) assuming normality 
in the distribution of errors. The reported numbers correspond to the coefficients of the probit model, 
while the marginal effects for selected sub-populations of workers are reported in Table 6. The t-tests, 
reported next to the coefficients are robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown kind using 
the White (1980) method. Most coefficients on the individual characteristic variables exhibit the expected 
patterns: female and o lder workers are less likely to be employed than prime-age (26-50) men. 
Additionally, the number of children per father increases the probability of being employed, and the 
number of children per mother decreases the probability of being employed. Instead, the coefficients on 
the variable young and unskilled change signs across specifications. 
In column (1) we report the results of interacting the JS measure with dummies for age (young 
and older), gender (women) and skill level. A negative (positive) sign  indicates that periods of more 
stringent JS provisions are associated with a decline (increase) in the probability of employment of a 
particular sub-population relative to the omitted category. We find strong age effects. The coefficient on 
the young-JS interaction is negative and statistically significant while the coefficient on the older-JS 
interaction is positive although not statistically significant. Our results suggest that high job security tends 
to bias the distribution of employment against younger workers. We also find significant effects across 
the skill divide. The coefficient on the unskilled-JS interaction is negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that JS provisions reduce the probability of employment of unskilled workers relative to 
skilled ones.  Lastly, the coefficient on the female-JS interaction suggests a negative effect of JS on the 
probability of employment of women relative to men.  
Column (2) shows the results once we control for the evolution of the minimum wage, union 
activity and deviations of GDP with respect to its trend, as well as interaction of these variables with age, 
gender and skill dummies. The only difference with respect to column (2) is that the coefficient on the 
dummy for older workers is now somewhat larger and statistically significant at the 10% level, suggesting 
that job security provisions benefit older workers relative to prime-age ones. In columns (3) and (4) we 
report the coefficients resulting from estimating the same specification for wage-employment and self-
employment separately.  Our results are encouraging since they suggest that our findings are driven by 
policy changes instead of by some unobservable factors correlated with labor policy and employment.   12 
The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients for total and wage-employment are very similar, except for 
the  coefficients on women. Instead, f or self-employment  the coefficients  are either not statistically 
different from zero or going in the opposite direction than for wage-employment. This is the case with the 
coefficients on the gender and unskilled variables, which suggest that more stringent JS regulations 
increase the probability that women and the unskilled are employment in the self-employment sector 
relative to men and the skilled. 
Column (5) exhibits the results once we allow for further interactions between age, skill and 
gender groups. With this finer level of disaggregation we can examine whether the impact of job security 
is the same across young men and young women, or across young skilled and unskilled workers. These 
additional variables not only provide a more complete description of the effects of JS on the distribution 
of employment, but also help to infer the channels through which JS affects that distribution. The 
coefficients for these additional interaction variables are all statistically significant, and a test for their 
joint significance strongly rejects the null hypothesis of all the coefficients being zero.  
The estimates in Column (5) contain some interesting additional information relative to the 
estimates in Column (1)-(4) We find that an increase in JS tends to reduce the employment probabilities 
of young men relative to those of young women. However, we also find that this effect is reversed at 
older ages. Thus, JS provisions seemingly reduce the probabilities of employment of middle-aged and 
older women relative to those of men in that same age group. Our estimates also suggest that an increase 
in JS provisions reduces the probability of employment of both skilled and unskilled youth, but the effect 
is larger for unskilled youth.  
Finally, column (6) reports the results of estimating the same specification than in column (6) but 
controlling in addition by the average wage of each sub-population group, in period t.  Controlling for the 
wage level of each group allows us to assess whether some of the observed effects are driven by 
differences in wage adjustment across sub-populations. Yet, the results should be taken with caution 
because some wage movements may be endogenous to the probability of employment. Overall we find 
that holding wages constant does not affect our main results. The only coefficient that changes size and 
significance is the interaction between young unskilled and job security. Holding wages constant reduces 
the coefficient and the significance of the effect on unskilled youth (relative to more skilled  youth). 
Instead, most of the other coefficients become larger (in absolute value) than the ones reported in column 
(5). This suggests that more stringent regulations are partly paid by workers in the form of lower wages.  
In light of the different theories described in Section 2, how do we explain the results presented 
above?   Although we cannot totally discriminate among different theories, we are at least able to reject 
some hypotheses. The fact that most of our results remain unchanged when wages are included suggests 
that the differential effects presented above cannot be explained by differences in the elasticity of labor   13 
supply across demographic groups. The only exception is the larger effect on young unskilled workers 
that seems to be driven by a higher labor supply elasticity of this group.
22 Our results also suggest that 
these differential effects cannot be explained by insider-outsider theories, since in that case the effect 
would also be through wages.  Instead, our results suggest that the differential effects on employment are 
demand driven: Changes in job security provisions bring about changes in hiring and firing rates that 
selectively affect different types of workers.  
A barrier-of-entry effect can explain the negative impact of job security on the employment rates 
of young workers relative to other demographic groups. However, it cannot account for the estimated 
differences in impact between young women and young men.  One possible way to explain these findings 
is to consider differences in turnover rates across groups. As discussed in Section 2, a higher exogenous 
turnover rate can bring about two effects. On the one hand, workers with a higher propensity to rotate 
have lower average tenures and therefore are more likely to be laid off in bad times. On the other hand, 
higher rotation reduces expected severance payments and therefore increases the incentives to hire these 
workers Higher rotation among women can explain why JS provisions affect young women  less than 
young men. It can also explain why middle-aged and older women benefit less from JS than men of the 
same age. 
Differences among turnover rates could also partially explain the results for skilled and unskilled 
workers. Higher rotation among the unskilled would imply lower tenure rates and higher probabilities of 
dismissal for middle-aged and older unskilled workers relative to more skilled ones. This is consistent 
with the deleterious effect of job security on the employment rates of middle-aged and older unskilled 
workers, relative to skilled ones. Of course, the higher turnover rates among unskilled workers are less 
likely to be exogenous to the decisions of employers than female turnover rates. In consequence, a 
complete discussion of this effect requires a model that explains why turnover rates are different in the 
first place. The model does not seem to able to explain why the effect on employment appears more 
negative on the unskilled than the on the skilled youth, but as we have seen, this effect seems to be driven 
by the more elastic labor supply of this group.  
 
6.2 Distribution of the Effect of Minimum Wages 
Table 5 also reports the results of interacting personal characteristic dummies with the evolution of 
minimum wages over time. A n increase in the statutory wage has  similar qualitative effects on the 
distribution of employment across age and skill than stricter job security provisions. To account for 
contemporary employment policies and economic conditions we include measures of union activity, job 
                                                                 
22 Cowan et al. (2003) find that, in Chile, seemingly high transitions between schooling and the labor market lead to 
a very elastic labor supply for the young unskilled.    14 
security provisions and GDP deviations, interacted with demographic dummies in all specifications  in 
columns (2) to (6) but not in column (7). As in other studies for developed countries, the results in column 
(7) suggest that an increase in the minimum wage shifts reduces the employment prospects of young 
workers relative to older ones. We also find a negative effect on the unskilled. Instead, our results also 
indicate that minimum wages hikes may increase the probability of employment for women relative to 
men.  
Controlling for the sub-group effects of contemporary changes in policy and the business cycle 
does not alter the results reported in column (7) (See column (3)). The comparison between the results 
obtained from the wage employment and the self-employment specifications (column (3) and (4)) is also 
encouraging. As with the coefficients associated to job security provisions, we find that the coefficients 
on wage employment are very similar to the ones obtained for total employment, while the coefficients on 
self-employment are not statistically significant. All in all, these results suggest that the effects we are 
capturing are indeed associated with changes in policy rather than with some unobservable correlate of 
employment.  
 In column (5) we present our results once we allow for differential effects across age-skill and 
age-gender categories and control for contemporaneous changes in policy and economic conditions. As in 
column (7), we find a negative effect of minimum wages on the employment rates of unskilled workers, 
particularly for middle-aged ones.  The effect of minimum wages is negative for young unskilled workers 
and not statistically significant for young skilled ones. Instead, higher minimum wages tend to shift 
employment towards older workers.  Lastly, we find that women, and in particular the young, tend to 
benefit from minimum wage policies.  
The former specification assumes that the effect of raising the minimum wage is unrelated to the 
level of the going wage. However, it is plausible that the effect be positively related to the distance 
between the statutory and the going wage.  To account for this possibility, we include average wages, 
computed as described in Section 5.
23 The results reported in column (6) indicate that controlling for the 
time evolution of the average wage of sub-population j = 1,…,12 does not alter the results reported in 
columns (3) to (5).  
While most of our findings are consistent with the competitive model, some are difficult to 
explain with this paradigm. For instance, this model cannot explain why minimum wages tend to shift 
employment towards women. Assuming that women have higher marginal products than men and adding 
worker heterogeneity to the simple competitive model, this shift can be explained as a “flight to quality” 
                                                                 
23 Including such variables is tantamount to including a set of non-coverage adjusted, demographic group-specific 
Kaitz ratios. However, we are not imposing the constraint that the coefficient on the minimum wage is the same as 
the coefficient on the group-specific average wage.  
   15 
effect. To see that, assume a population of heterogeneous workers that prior to the minimum wage 
increase were each paid their marginal value. After an increase in minimum wages, all workers with a 
marginal value below the new minimum wage cease to be employed. Assuming a perfectly elastic supply 
of all types of workers firms replace lower marginal value workers with higher value ones. This 
explanation, however, is at odds with the widespread observation that women’s wages are lower than 
men’s. Another possible interpretation is that while men are able to obtain wages that are close to the 
competitive ones, women’s wages are below their marginal products. This would be consistent with the 
systematic wage gaps found between observationally identical men and women and with the asymmetric 
gender effects of minimum wages. If wage-gaps are explained by imperfect competition in female labor 
markets, employers are supply constrained when hiring  women. Therefore, a n increase in minimum 
wages can expand both labor supply and employment rates.   
 
6.3 Total Effects  
In our previous results, all the estimated coefficients measured the effects of labor regulations on each 
particular sub-population  relative to the omitted category, but they  did not provide information on 
whether the employment probabilities of the different sub-groups increased or declined in absolute terms 
after changes in policy. In this section, we attempt to gauge the total effects of labor market policies on 
the probability of employment by estimating their effect on the aggregate employment rates of prime-
aged skilled men (the omitted category in the specifications reported in Table 5).  To do so, we estimate 
the following error correction specification:  
 
DNt=c-l(Nt-1 -N
*) + B1(yt – yt*)+ +B2 DLog(Wt )+ B3LDN t-L+et    (1) 
where   Nt
*  = g0  + g1Log(JSt)+ g2 Log(MWt)+g3Log(Uniont)     (2) 
 
and where Nt  denotes the employment rate–i.e. the employment to population ratio—of prime-aged male 
skilled workers in period t, Nt
*  denotes long-run equilibrium employment,
  yt –yt* denotes GDP deviations 
from its trend (in logs), Wt  denotes average wages for prime-age skilled male workers, JSt denotes the 
measure of Job Security,   MWt  denotes minimum wages, Uniont  denotes the index of wage bargaining 
and L is the length of the maximum lag.  In expression (1), employment changes in function of: previous 
period deviations from long-run equilibrium employment; GDP deviations from its trend; changes in 
wages and short run dynamics.  Expression (2) assumes that, in the long run, employment rates are a 
function of labor market policies and the structure of wage bargaining.    
Using aggregate time series techniques to estimate the effect of policies on the reference group 
allows us to model short and long-run employment dynamics. The first step in the estimation of   16 
expression (1) and (2) is to test whether the variables are stationary. The first panel in Table 7 reports the 
results of testing for the presence of unit roots using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF). The tests 
are specified with three lags. In those cases in which the plot of the series indicated the presence of a time 
trend we included a constant and a time trend in the specification, in the other cases, we included only a 
constant. While we can reject the unit root hypothesis for GDP deviations from its trend and for changes 
in hourly wages, we cannot reject non-stationarity for the lagged employment rate, the logarithm of 
minimum wages, the logarithm of the job security index and the logarithm of union centralization.  
However, ADF tests on the first differences of these four series indicate that the hypothesis that these 
series are integrated of order one, I(1), is not rejected.    
Given the non-stationarity of the employment rate, expression (1) is well defined only if lagged 
employment deviations with respect to the long-run equilibrium rate are stationary. This is equivalent to 
saying that the series Nt
* has to cointegrate with Nt-1.  The second panel in Table 7 reports the results of the 
Johansen cointegration test between N
* and Nt-1. The likelihood ratio test indicates the presence of three 
cointegrating equations indicating that the error correction model is well defined. 
Table 8 presents the results of estimating the error correction model (ECM) once expression (2) 
has been substituted into (1). We use the results of the AIC test to determine the optimal length of the 
lagged endogenous variable and determine that L=1. We estimate the ECM with and without wages to see 
whether introducing wages alters our results and find the results to be very similar in both cases. 
Essentially, we find that while job security provisions increase the long-run equilibrium rate of prime-
aged skilled male employment. This is not totally surprising. As mentioned in  Section 2, job security 
provisions increase the cost of dismissing workers with long tenure relative to the costs of dismissing less 
tenured workers, reducing the layoff rate of the first relative to the layoff rate of the latter. Since prime-
age skilled workers tend to have longer tenures than other, younger, less skilled workers, job security 
provisions reduce the layoff rates of prime-age skilled  workers relative to the layoff rate of other 
demographic groups. The positive sign in the ECM suggests that this effect on the layoff rate more than 
compensates for the negative effect of JS on employment creation. Instead, we do not reject the 
hypothesis that an increase in the minimum wage does not affect the employment rate of prime-aged, 
skilled male workers regardless of whether we control for the evolution of wages.  
The estimated effect of job security provisions and minimum wages on the employment rate, can 
be used to infer the total effect of these regulations on the employment probabilities of other demographic 
groups. In order to do so, the coefficients on job security provisions and minimum wages, reported in 
Table 8, should be divided by (minus) the coefficient on the lagged employment variable, to obtain the 
coefficients in expression (2). They reflect the magnitude of the long-run effect of regulations on prime-
age skilled male employment. The third and fourth columns of Table 6 present our estimates for the total   17 
effects. They are obtained by adding the marginal effect reported in the first and second columns of Table 
6 to the long-run elasticities obtained from specification (1) in Table 8.
24 
The total effects reported in columns (3) and (4) suggest that job security provisions not only shift 
the distribution of employment towards older and skilled workers, but also  increase their employment 
rates. Instead, more stringent job security provisions reduce the employment rates of young workers.  
Moreover,  job security provisions reduce employment opportunities for women while increasing those of 
men. The magnitudes of these estimated effects are substantial. According to them, the 1990 labor reform, 
which increased our measure of job security in about one third,  reduced the employment rates of young 
unskilled male workers by 1.6 percentage points of the population.   
We also find non-neutral effects of minimum wage spikes. Our estimates suggest that a 10% 
increase in minimum wages reduces the probability of employment for young unskilled male workers by 
0.51 percentage points. Lastly, we find that a 10% increase in the minimum wage raises the employment 




The effect of regulations is far from neutral across demographic sub-groups. Paradoxically, job security 
and minimum wage regulations appear to be detrimental to those same workers that they are supposed to 
help. Our results suggest that both minimum wages and job security regulations reduce the employment 
opportunities of the young, the unskilled and particularly  unskilled youth while promoting the 
employment rates of skilled and older workers. We have also found indications that job security 
regulations may force some workers, particularly women and the unskilled, out of wage employment and 
into self-employment.  
There is an ongoing debate on whether raising minimum wages and job security provisions have 
any effects on aggregate employment rates. However, even if researchers concluded that job security 
provisions or minimum wages do not have an effect in the aggregate, it is important to carefully consider 
these distributional effects when evaluating their desirability. At best, these policies will help some 
disadvantaged workers at the expense of other poor, young or low skilled workers. At worse, they 
distribute jobs from less advantaged to better-off workers.  
                                                                 
24 The long run effect of job security on the employment rates of middle age skilled workers is computed as 0.011 
divided by 0.63, which is equal to 0.017.   18 
8. References 
Banco Central de Chile. 2001. “Indicadores Económicos y Sociales de Chile: 1960-2000.”  Banco Central 
de Chile, Santiago de Chile. 
Bazen, S., and N. Skourias.  1997. “Is There a Negative Effect of Minimum Wages on Youth 
Unemployment in France?” European Economic Review 41(3-5): 723-32. 
Bentolila, S. and  G. Bertola. 1990. “Firing Costs and Labour Demand: How Bad is Eurosclerosis?” 
Review of Economic Studies 57: 381-402. 
Bentolila, S. and  G. Saint-Paul. 1994. “A Model of Labor Demand With Linear Adjustment Costs.” 
Labour Economics (1): 303-26. 
Bertola, G. 1990. “Job Security, Employment and Wages.” European Economic Review 34: 851-86. 
Bertola, G . 1991. “Labor Turnover Costs and Average Labor Demand.”  National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper  #3866. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Bertola, G., F. Blau and L. Kahn. 2002.  “ Labor Market Institutions and Demographic Employment 
Patterns.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper  #9043.  Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
Bosworth, B., R. Dornbusch and R. Laban,  editors. 1994. The Chilean Economy, Policy Lessons and 
Challenges. The Brooking Institution, Washington D.C. 
Bravo, D., and J. Vial. 1997. “La Fijación del Salario Mínimo en Chile: Elementos para una Discusión.” 
Colección de Estudios CIEPLAN 43: 117-151. 
Card, D., L.F. Katz and A.B. Krueger. 1993. “Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the 
Fast Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.” National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper 4509. Cambridge, Mass. 
Card, D., L.F. Katz and A.B. Krueger. 1994. “Employment Effects of Minimum Wages: Panel Data on 
State Minimum Wages Laws: Comment.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 47 (3): 487-
97.  
Card, D., and A. Krueger. 2000. “Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast Food 
Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Reply.” American Economic Review 90: 1397-1420. 
Castañeda, T. 1983. “Salarios mínimos y empleo en el Gran Santiago: 1978 y 1981.” Cuadernos de 
Economía 61. 
Cortazar, R., and  J.  Vial.  1998.  Construyendo Opciones: Propuestas Economicas y Sociales para el 
Cambio de Siglo. Santiago, Chile: Cieplan and DOMEN Editions. 
Cowan, K., A. Micco, A. Mizala, C. Pagés,  and P. Romaguera. 2003. “Un Diagnostico del Desempleo en 
Chile.” Mimeo Inter-American Development Bank and Departamento Ingenieria Aplicada U. 
Chile.   
Davis, S ., and  J. Haltiwanger.  1992. “Gross Job C reation, Gross Job Destruction, and Employment 
Reallocation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(3): 819-63. 
De la Cuadra, S., and D. Hachette. 1991. “Lessons from the Chilean Stabilization and Recovery.” In: B. 
Bosworth, R. Dornbusch and R. Laban, editors. 1994. “The Chilean Economy, Policy Lessons 
and Challenges.” The Brooking Institution, Washington D. C. 
Dowrick, S., and J. Quiggin. 1993. “A Survey of the Literature on Minimum Wages.” Australian National 
University and University of Queensland. Mimeo.   19 
Edwards, S., and A. Cox-Edwards. 1987. “Monetarism and Liberalization: The Chilean Experiment.” The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2nd Edition, 1991. 
Edwards, S. and Cox-Edwards, A. 2000. “Economic Reforms and Labour Markets: Policy Issues and 
Lessons from Chile.” Economic Policy 15(30): 181-230. 
Hamermesh, D. S. 1993. Labor Demand. Princeton, United States: Princeton University Press. 
Heckman, J., and C. Pagés. 2000. “The Cost of Job Security Regulation: Evidence from Latin American 
Labor Markets.” Economía 1(1): 147-151. 
Hopenhayn, H .,  and Rogerson, R ichard. 1993. “Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General 
Equilibrium Analysis.” Journal of Political Economy 101(5): 915-38. 
Hudson, R. 1994. “Chile: A Country Study.” Library of Congress, Washington D. C. 
Katz, L. and A. Krueger. 1992. “The Effect of the Minimum Wage on the Fast-Food Industry.” Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 46(1): 6-21. 
Kosters, M .H.,  editor. 1996.  “Effects of the Minimum Wages on Employment.” A EI Press for the 
American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C. 
Lazear, E. 1990. “Job Security Provisions and Employment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 105(3): 
699-726. 
Lindbeck A., and D.J. Snower. 1988. The Insider Outsider Theory of Employment and Unemployment. 
MIT Press, Cambridge and London. 
Montenegro, Claudio E. 1998. “The Structure of Wages in Chile: 1960-1996: An Application of Quantile 
Regression.” Estudios de Economía 25(1): 71-98. 
Montenegro, Claudio E. 2002. “Unemployment, Job Security, and Minimum Wages in Chile: 1960-
2001.” Washington, DC. World Bank. Mimeo. 
Pagés, C., and C.E. Montenegro. 1999. “Job Security and the Age Composition of Employment: Evidence 
from Chile.” Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department, Working Paper # 398. 
Paredes, Ricardo, and Luis Riveros. 1989. “Sesgo de Selección y el Efecto de los Salarios Mínimos.” 
Cuadernos de Economía 79. 
Partridge, M ., and J. Partridge. 1998 “Are Teen Unemployment Rates Influenced by State Minimum 
Wage Laws?” Growth and Change 29(4):359-82. 
Risager, O., and J.R. Sorensen. 1997. “On the Effects of Firing Costs When Investment Is Endogenous: 
An Extension of a Model by Bertola.” European Economic Review 41(7): 1343-53. 
Romaguera, P., C . Echevarria and P . Gonzalez. 1995. “Chile.”  In: G . Márquez, editor. Reforming the 
Labor Market in a Liberalized Econom”. The Inter-American Development Bank, John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland. 
Soto, R. 1995. “Trade Liberalization in Chile: Lessons for Hemispheric Integration.” In: E.L. Echeverri-
Carroll, editor. NAFTA and Trade Liberalization in the Americas. Austin: University of Texas, 
Graduate School of Business, Bureau of Business Research in cooperation with the ICSS112 
Institute. 
White, H. 1980. “A Heterokedasticity-Consistent  Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for 
Heterokedasticity.” Econometrica 48: 817-838. 
Williams, N., and J. Mills. 2001. “The Minimum Wage and Teenage Employment: Evidence from Time 
Series.”  Applied Economics 33(3): 285-300.   20 
Wisecarver, D. 1992.  “El Modelo Económico Chileno.” Centro Internacional para el Desarrollo 
Económico (CINDE). Instituto de Economía de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. 
Santiago de Chile. 
.  21 
 
Graph 1 


























Source: Pagés and Montenegro (1999). 
 
Graph 2 






































For people under 18 y/o For people over 18 y/o
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (see data section). 
 







































































Employment Rate Dependent Rate Self-Employment Rate
 
Graph 4 






















































Bargaining Index Smoothed Bargaining Index
Bargaining Index measures the degree of centralization of wage bargaining.  It takes values from 1 to 4. Higher values indicate higher centralization 
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Table 2. Parameters used to compute Index 
 




1960-65  .92 
 
.88  1  1  0  0 
1966-73  .92 
 
.88  1  .2  0  (1) 
1974-77  .92 
 
.88  1  .5  0  (2) 
1978-80  .92 
 
.88  1  .8  0  (2) 
1981-84  .92 
 
.88  1  .8  0  (3) 
1985-90  .92 
 
.88  1  0  0  (3) 
1991-  .92 
 
.88  1  .9  (4)  (5) 
 
 
Notes: To compute b we use the fact that the average real interest from 1960-1998 was 8.4%. To compute d we 
assume that the average Chilean turnover rate  without employment protection would be similar to the US one. 
According to Davis and Haltiwanger (1995) average turnover rates average 12% a year in the United States. (1) 
Corresponds to one month’s pay per year of work augmented by three months to capture the average payments in 
foregone wages during trial.  (2) One month’s pay per year of work without upper limit.  (3) One month’s pay per 
year of work with a five months upper limit. (4) One month’ s pay per year of work with 11 months upper limit. (5) 
1.2 month’s pay per year of work with 11 months upper limit. We assume the maximum tenure a worker can attain 
at a firm is 25 years. 26 
 
Table 3. Basic Statistics of the Sample 
 
Minimum Wage  Bargaining Index  Average Wage 





















Year  Col. (1)  Col. (2)  Col. (3)  Col. (4)  Col. (5)  Col. (6)  Col. (7)  Col. (8)  Col. (9)  Col. (10)  Col. (11)  Col. (12)  Col. (13)  Col. (14)  Col. (15)  Col. (16) 
60  0.5199  119  119  3.33333  3.33333  302  152  157  475  133  283  306  -0.86%  52.5%  39.8%  12.7% 
61  0.5199  114  114  3.33333  3.33333  370  179  171  554  164  331  435  -1.41%  52.2%  41.1%  11.1% 
62  0.5199  126  126  3.33333  3.33333  373  203  181  615  162  361  418  -1.37%  53.2%  41.2%  11.9% 
63  0.5199  109  109  3.33333  3.33333  376  206  n.a.  311  219  342  395  0.20%  53.0%  41.4%  11.5% 
64  0.5199  107  107  3.33333  3.33333  268  160  n.a.  230  133  272  296  -2.15%  52.9%  42.3%  10.6% 
65  0.5199  114  114  3.33333  3.33333  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -5.23%  54.4%  43.3%  11.2% 
66  3.9090  118  118  3.33333  3.33333  380  211  187  591  179  376  434  1.50%  53.0%  42.2%  10.8% 
67  3.9090  116  116  3.33333  3.34724  427  268  222  648  217  420  539  1.50%  54.0%  43.2%  10.8% 
68  3.9090  111  111  3.33333  3.39543  466  278  224  699  251  450  502  1.79%  53.2%  41.9%  11.4% 
69  3.9090  107  107  3.33333  3.46403  475  279  231  709  218  470  560  2.79%  52.4%  41.2%  11.2% 
70  3.9090  133  133  3.66667  3.53596  549  351  256  804  248  536  693  2.97%  52.3%  41.4%  10.9% 
71  3.9090  183  183  3.66667  3.57675  689  437  302  957  307  660  779  9.67%  53.7%  42.1%  11.5% 
72  3.9090  195  195  3.66667  3.52856  712  457  342  929  359  698  729  7.28%  52.7%  41.3%  11.4% 
73  3.9090  108  108  3.66667  3.40525  525  332  279  671  280  512  553  0.37%  51.4%  39.6%  11.8% 
74  1.8642  204  204  3  3.26140  435  310  275  561  255  436  496  0.12%  49.0%  37.1%  11.8% 
75  1.8642  245  245  3  3.12419  376  277  225  483  214  376  420  -14.58%  45.0%  34.7%  10.4% 
76  1.8642  259  259  3      3.01390  486  352  249  635  280  474  542  -12.67%  45.8%  34.5%  11.2% 
77  1.8642  269  269  3  2.88227  692  512  320  953  357  696  786  -5.01%  48.3%  38.1%  10.1% 
78  1.0599  346  346  3  2.62090  868  517  360  1090  400  799  1072  0.87%  48.0%  37.1%  10.9% 
79  1.0599  345  345  2.66667  2.27455  913  640  432  1150  496  904  1009  6.66%  47.8%  36.8%  10.9% 
80  1.0599  354  354  1.33333  1.90434  890  611  424  1120  476  881  932  11.83%  47.4%  36.6%  10.7% 
81  0.8772  334  334  1.33333  1.53353  1057  799  510  1338  590  1099  1016  15.64%  50.9%  39.3%  11.6% 
82  0.8772  365  365  1.33333  1.25825  1235  852  508  1499  618  1206  1295  -1.15%  41.8%  33.0%  8.8% 
83  0.8772  276  276  1  1.13070  842  622  345  1056  416  872  721  -6.79%  43.5%  34.4%  9.1% 
84  0.8772  243  243  1  1.06209  843  573  355  1028  371  845  780  -4.19%  46.1%  35.8%  10.3% 
85  2.2915  220  220  1  1.01390  699  480  312  808  323  683  725  -6.19%  46.4%  36.6%  9.8% 
86  2.2915  215  215  1  1  653  471  301  742  314  634  731  -5.35%  47.0%  37.3%  9.7% 
87  2.2915  199  199  1  1  796  539  288  932  355  764  907  -4.05%  50.1%  39.5%  10.5% 
88  2.2915  222  222  1  1.02781  766  542  316  902  376  751  799  -2.93%  50.9%  38.6%  12.2% 
89  2.2915  293  340  1  1.12419  869  679  376  981  434  868  973  0.41%  53.1%  41.6%  11.5% 
90  2.2915  298  346  1  1.26140  1003  682  390  1074  462  960  1011  -2.83%  52.0%  40.5%  11.4% 
91  3.0598  278  327  1.66667  1.40525  971  694  401  1046  470  951  949  -2.47%  53.2%  41.2%  11.9% 
92  3.0598  293  340  1.66667  1.54247  904  726  455  998  503  914  900  1.47%  55.7%  43.6%  12.1% 
93  3.0598  294  341  1.66667  1.63885  1072  832  496  1158  627  1054  1093  0.98%  55.9%  44.0%  11.9% 
94  3.0598  294  342  1.66667  1.66667  1141  840  535  1194  624  1101  1163  -1.22%  55.4%  42.5%  12.9% 
95  3.0598  302  351  1.66667  1.66667  1230  919  566  1310  657  1215  1199  0.81%  55.5%  42.8%  12.7% 
96  3.0598  279  324  1.66667  1.66667  1329  1047  621  1412  725  1283  1465  1.59%  55.8%  43.7%  12.0% 
97  3.0598  248  333  1.66667  1.66667  1392  1100  613  1505  775  1380  1335  2.79%  56.7%  44.1%  12.6% 
98  3.0598  243  341  1.66667  1.66667  1356  1136  759  1427  792  1325  1500  0.70%  56.8%  43.6%  13.2% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations (see data section). 
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Table 4. General Economic Indicators: Chile 1960-1998 
 Series Name 









total (% of total 
labor force)  
National 
Unemployment, 





total (% of total labor 
force ages 15-24)  
Gran Santiago 
Unemployment, 
total (% of total 
labor force)  
Gini 
Coefficient 
1960  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  8.0  42.5 
1961  1.5  7.7  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  7.1  45.2 
1962  2.7  14.0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  5.7  45.5 
1963  3.6  44.1  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  5.2  n.a. 
1964  0.3  46.0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  4.9  n.a. 
1965  -1.8  28.8  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  5.0  n.a. 
1966  7.6  23.1  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  6.0  45.2 
1967  1.5  18.8  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  5.9  45.8 
1968  1.6  26.3  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  6.4  48.1 
1969  1.5  30.4  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  7.1  48.0 
1970  0.2  32.5  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  7.0  47.5 
1971  7.1  20.0  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  5.2  47.7 
1972  -2.5  74.8  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  3.7  43.1 
1973  -6.5  361.5  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  3.1  44.1 
1974  0.8  504.7  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  10.3  40.7 
1975  -12.8  374.7  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  16.1  41.1 
1976  1.8  211.8  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  18.0  47.2 
1977  7.1  91.9  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  13.0  48.4 
1978  5.9  40.1  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  12.8  49.8 
1979  7.1  33.4  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  12.5  49.4 
1980  6.5  35.1  10.4  10.0  20.8  11.7  49.1 
1981  3.2  19.7  11.3  9.9  21.5  9.0  47.3 
1982  -11.7  9.9  19.6  18.3  30.5  23.2  51.2 
1983  -5.3  27.3  14.6  14.7  24.7  22.7  52.7 
1984  6.3  19.9  13.9  n.a.  25.2  18.4  54.2 
1985  5.4  29.5  12.1  13.4  22.7  16.2  51.5 
1986  3.9  20.6  8.8  9.7  17.3  15.4  48.7 
1987  4.9  19.9  7.9  9.3  n.a.  13.5  57.6 
1988  5.5  14.7  6.3  7.8  14.3  11.2  53.7 
1989  8.7  17.0  5.3  6.1  13.2  9.3  50.8 
1990  1.9  26.0  5.7  5.7  13.1  9.7  53.9 
1991  6.2  21.8  5.3  5.8  12.7  8.3  52.4 
1992  10.4  15.4  4.4  5.6  10.9  6.0  47.4 
1993  5.2  12.7  4.5  5.1  11.0  6.4  45.4 
1994  4.0  11.4  5.9  6.8  13.2  6.3  45.9 
1995  8.9  8.2  4.7  5.3  11.5  6.1  46.3 
1996  5.7  7.4  5.4  6.7  12.8  7.2  45.4 
1997  6.0  6.1  5.3  6.6  13.0  6.7  n.a. 
1998  2.5  5.1  7.2  7.6  16.7  6.9  n.a. 
 
 
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators Data Base and Gini coefficient from background data,  






Table 5. The Effect of Job Security and Minimum Wages 
Probit Results 
 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 




 Employment  Employed  Employed  Employed 
    b  t-test  b  t-test  b  t-test  b  t-test  b  t-test  b  t-test  b  t-test 
  Dummy young  -0.8954 -104.2 0.4921  2.6  0.9189  5.0  -0.4202 -1.4  -1.1703  -6.1  -0.9651 -4.9  1.2757  9.1 
  Dummy old  -0.6709 -66.8  -1.6509 -7.3  -1.6967 -7.5  0.4176  1.7  -2.0996  -9.1  -2.1226 -9.0  -1.4101 -8.6 
  Dummy women  -0.5461 -66.7  -2.0260 -12.2 -1.8595 -11.6 -0.3632 -1.7  -2.4113  -14.2 -1.9622 -11.3 -2.7873 -22.7 
  Dummy unskilled  0.0007  0.1  1.8635  10.9  1.8843  11.2  -0.3281 -1.5  1.4867  8.6  1.8356  10.3  2.2867  18.1 
  Children per father  0.1570  45.0  0.1569  44.6  0.0594  25.7  0.0273  11.3  0.1152  32.0  0.1152  31.5  0.1562  44.6 
  Children per mather  -0.3931 -93.9  -0.3921 -92.7 -0.3147 -86.9 -0.0196 -5.4  -0.3179  -70.1 -0.3160 -68.5 -0.3919 -93.1 
 
Dummy young  -0.0935 -10.8  -0.1112 -12.7 -0.0826 -9.7  -0.0161 -1.2  -0.0913  -5.6  -0.1163 -6.7     
Dummy old  0.0124  1.2  0.0196  1.8  0.0292  2.7  0.0173  1.5  0.0253  1.2  0.0123  0.6     
Dummy women  -0.0468 -6.1  -0.0266 -3.4  -0.0021 -0.3  0.0267  2.7  -0.0546  -4.5  -0.0873 -6.8     
Dummy unskilled  -0.0334 -4.2  -0.0563 -7.0  -0.0733 -9.3  0.0344  3.4  -0.0382  -3.3  -0.0596 -4.8     
Dummy young*dummy women                  0.0835  4.7  0.1033  5.4     
Dummy old*dummy women                  -0.0035  -0.2  0.0064  0.3     












































































  0.0033  0.2  0.0146  0.6     
 
Dummy young      -0.1406 -8.2  -0.1557  -9.3  -0.0366 -1.3  -0.0111  -0.6  -0.0215 -1.2  -0.2129 -16.0 
Dummy old      0.0913  4.4  0.0911  4.4  -0.0286 -1.3  0.1301  6.2  0.1301  6.1  0.0715  4.6 
Dummy women      0.1455  9.6  0.1551  10.7  -0.0299 -1.5  0.1677  10.8  0.1303  8.2  0.2097  18.0 
Dummy unskilled      -0.1811 -11.6 -0.1811  -11.9 0.0304  1.5  -0.1587  -10.1 -0.1810 -11.2 -0.2196 -18.3 
Dummy young*dummy women                  0.0248  11.0  0.0223  9.8     
Dummy old*dummy women                  -0.0035  -1.3  -0.0019 -0.7     












































































  0.0133  4.9  0.0145  5.3     
 
Dummy young      0.1320  8.2  0.1422  9.2  0.0800  3.0  -0.3006  -13.1 -0.2785 -11.9    
Dummy old      0.0272  1.4  0.0241  1.2  0.0152  0.7  -0.0966  -3.2  -0.0854 -2.8     
Dummy women      -0.0968 -6.8  -0.1222 -8.9  0.0802  4.2  -0.2494  -13.5 -0.2177 -11.6    
Dummy unskilled      0.0756  5.2  0.0480  3.4  0.0358  1.9  -0.0843  -4.6  -0.0599 -3.3     
Dummy young*dummy women                  0.2957  12.3  0.2712  10.9     
Dummy old*dummy women                  0.1530  5.2  0.1359  4.5     








































































  0.0265  0.9  0.0249  0.8     
 
Dummy young      -0.0852 -0.9  0.2102  2.2  0.0208  0.1  -0.2928  -1.7  -0.3618 -2.1     
Dummy old      -0.3872 -3.1  -0.2161 -1.7  -0.0041 0.0  -0.7902  -3.4  -0.8027 -3.4     
Dummy women      -0.4917 -5.5  -0.3108 -3.6  0.3153  2.7  -0.8047  -6.0  -0.8958 -6.7     
Dummy unskilled      0.4345  4.8  0.3467  3.9  0.0777  0.7  0.4079  3.2  0.4152  3.2     
Dummy young*dummy women                  0.3973  2.0  0.5022  2.5     
Dummy old*dummy women                  0.3863  1.6  0.4749  1.9     










































































  0.1912  0.8  0.1761  0.7     
 
  Logarithm of hourly wage                      0.1520  16.9     
  Number of Observations  303945  303945  303945  303945  303945  295318  303945 
  Pseudo R2  0.196  0.168  0.11  0.08  0.211  0.210  0.197 
Note: Besides the control variables mentioned in the table, all specifications include yearly dummies (not reported). Standard errors are  
robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity. The employed dummy variable is defined as 1 if the person is employed and 0 otherwise  
(unemployed or inactive). The wage employment dummy variable is defined as 1 if the person is a dependent employee and 0 otherwise 
(independent, unemployed or inactive). The self-employed dummy variable is defined as 1 if the person is an employer or if the person 
works as an independent worker and 0 otherwise (dependent, unemployed or inactive).   
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Table 6. Marginal and Total Effects of Labor Market Regulations 
 
  Marginal Effects   Total Effects  
 
Job Security  Min. Wage  Job Security  Min. Wage 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 






   






   






   






   






   
Unskilled 
-0.0343  -0.012 
-0.0173  -0.012 
 
[0.000]  [0.09] 
   
Skilled 
-0.015  0.044 
0.002  0.044 
 
[0.000]  [0.000] 
   
Women 
-0.0278  0.0463 
-0.0108  0.0463 
 
[0.000]  [0.000] 
   
Men 
-0.0151  -0.017 
0.0019  -0.017 
 
[0.000]  [0.000] 
   
Young 
-0.0394  0.0134 
-0.0224  0.0134 
 
[0.000]  [0.08] 
   
Older 
-0.008  0.0596 
0.009  0.0596 
 
[0.14]  [0.000] 
   




Name of the Series Symbol Specification ADF Test Statistic  5% Critical Value
GDP deviation from its trend y-y* Constant -4.8412 -2.9472
Wage Growth  D (logW) Constant -3.8514 -2.9705
Logarithm Minimum Wage L(Minwage) Trend -1.4709 -3.5426
Logarithm Job Security L(JS) Constant -2.43 -2.9472
Logarithm Union Centralization L(Union) Trend -2.7568 -3.5426
Lagged Employment Rate Nt-1 Constant -1.6736 -2.9472
First diff. Lagged Emp. Rate D Nt-1 Constant -3.0433 -2.9499
Change in Log Minimum Wage D L(Minwage) Constant -2.5591 -2.9499
Change in Log JS D L(Index) Constant -2.655 -2.9499
Change in Log Union  DL(Union) Constant -2.3443 -2.9499
Panel 2: Johansen Cointegration Test






* (**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level
34.91
Table 7. Unit Root and Cointegration Tests
9.24 At most 3 
19.96
None**
At most 1 **
At most 2 *
5% critical Value Hypothesized number of CE
53.12  31 
Table 8. Level Effects on Male Prime-Age Employment 
 
  (1)  (2) 
Independent Variables:     
Nt-1  -0.63  -0.66 
  (-3.05)  (-3.24) 
Deviations  GDPt  0.08  0.10 
  (1.21)  (1.48) 
D  log Wt      -  0.018 
    (0.84) 
Log (JS)   0.011  0.015 
  (1.80)  (2.23) 
Log (Minwage)  -0.01  -0.014 
  (-0.93)  (-1.13) 
Log (Union)   0.03  0.029 
  (1.54)  (1.45) 
Constant  0.61  0.651 
  (3.55)  (3.92) 
D Nt-1  0.277  0.239 
  (1.48)  (1.30) 
N obs.  37  35 
Adj. R squared  0.16  0.23 
 
 





Long term Effect of Minwage   0  0 
          t-statistics shown in parenthesis.  
 